Souls and the Location of Time in Physics IV 14, 223a16–223a29 by Loughlin, Tim
  
Souls  and  the  Location  of  Time  in  Physics  IV  14,  223 a 16-223 a 29  
Tim  Loughlin  
  
It  is  also  worth  investigating  how  time  is  related  to  the  soul,  and  for  what  reason  it  is  that  
time  is  thought  to  be  in  everything  -  on  earth  and  in  the  sea  and  in  the  heavens.  Is  it  that  
it  is  a  property  or  a  state  of  change,  being  the  number  [of  it],  and  all  these  things  are  
changeable,  since  they  are  all  in  place,  and  time  and  change  are  together  both  in  
potentiality  and  in  actual  operation?  One  might  find  it  a  difficult  question,  whether  if  
there  were  no  soul  there  would  be  time  or  not.  For  if  it  is  impossible  that  there  should  be  
something  to  do  the  counting,  it  is  also  impossible  that  anything  should  be  countable,  so  
that  it  is  clear  that  there  would  be  no  number  either,  for  number  is  either  that  which  has  
been  counted  or  that  which  can  be.  But  if  there  is  nothing  that  has  it  in  its  nature  to  count  
except  soul,  and  of  soul  [the  part  which  is]  intellect,  then  it  is  impossible  that  there  should  
be  time  if  there  is  no  soul,  except  that  there  could  be  that  X  which  time  is,  whatever  X  
makes  it  what  it  is;  as  for  example  if  it  is  possible  for  there  to  be  change  without  soul.  
The  before  and  after  are  in  change,  and  time  is  these  qua  countable.  (223 a 16-29) 1   
 
1.0 Introduction  
In  the  above  passage  Aristotle  is  concerned  with  what  seem  to  be  two  separate  questions:   
(Q1) How  is  time  related  to  the  soul?  
(Q2) For  what  reason  is  it  that  time  is  thought  to  be  in  everything?  
Interpretations  of  this  passage  have  focused  on  (Q1),  which  is  fitting  since  this  is  the  question  to  
which  Aristotle  seems  to  devote  more  attention.  There  are,  however,  two  reasons  to  pay  some  
attention  to  (Q2).  First,  although  we  often  speak  of  things  being  located  in  time, 2  there  is  little   
discussion  of  the  location  of  time.  It's  worthwhile  considering  just  what  might  be  meant  by  time  
being  in  something  and  why  it  might  be  thought  that  time  is  located  in  everything.  Second,  the  
way  that  Aristotle  introduces  (Q2)  indicates  that  it  may  have  some  relation  to  (Q1).  Notice  that  
Aristotle  raises  some  further  questions  concerning  (Q2),  but  rather  than  answering  these  
1  I  will  be  using  Edward  Hussey’s  (1993)  translation,  except  where  noted  otherwise.  All  alterations  in   
typeface  are  inserted  by  me  for  emphasis.  Parenthetical  remarks  are  present  in  the  source  text,  bracketed  remarks  
are  inserted  by  the  translator,  and  braced  remarks  are  inserted  by  me.  
2   I  will  address  the  issue  of  being  in  time  at  some  length  in  section  2.22  below.  
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questions,  he  turns  his  attention  to  (Q1).  Is  something  he  says  about  (Q1)  supposed  to  answer  
the  questions  connected  to  (Q2)?  Do  the  questions  connected  to  (Q2)  somehow  raise  (Q1)  or  
does  (Q1)  somehow  raise  (Q2)?  Or,  if  there  is  no  relation  between  the  two  at  all,  why  does  
Aristotle  raise  the  questions  together  in  this  way?  In  this  paper  I  explore  why  it  is  that  Aristotle  
juxtaposes  (Q1)  and  (Q2)  in  the  way  he  does  and  what  the  location  of  time  has  to  do  with  it.  
I  argue  that  Aristotle  is  committed  to  the  claim  that  time  only  exists  where  change  is  
countable  and  that  this  explains  the  juxtaposition  of  (Q1)  and  (Q2).  Why  might  Aristotle  believe  
that  there  is  time  only  where  there  is  countable  change?  Why  might  he  believe  that  change  is  
located  anywhere  at  all?  He  maintains  that  time  is  the  before  and  after  of  change  qua  counted  or  
countable.  If  time  is  identical  to  change  qua  countable  and  changes  have  locations,  then  time  
will  be  located  where  and  only  where  countable  changes  are  located.  If  Aristotle’s  theory  
commits  him  to  there  being  time  only  where  change  is  countable,  and  if  there  are  or  might  be  
uncountable  changes,  then  the  belief  that  time  is  in  everything  seems  to  challenge  Aristotle’s  
theory,  since  he  seems  to  be  committed  to  the  claim  that  time  is  not  in  everything.  If  this  is  the  
position  that  Aristotle  finds  himself  in,  he  can  argue  either  that  his  theory  is  not  committed  to  the  
problematic  claim,  that  no  change  is  uncountable,  or  that  the  belief  that  time  is  in  everything  is  
false.  However,  his  theory  is  pretty  clearly  committed  to  the  problematic  claim  and  he  explicitly  
endorses  the  existence  of  uncountable  changes,  specifically  in  the  heavens.  So,  he  must  take  the  
belief  that  time  is  in  everything  to  be  false.  However,  given  Aristotle’s  somewhat  deferential  
attitude  toward  folk  beliefs,  if  he  were  to  choose  the  third  option,  he  might  feel  the  need  to  find  
some  truth  in  the  claim  that  time  is  everywhere.  Even  if  he  were  dismissive  of  folk  beliefs,  it  
would  still  be  incumbent  on  him  to  explain  why  this  false  belief  is  so  widely  held.  One  way  to  
do  this  would  be  to  explain  that,  although  time  might  not  be  located  in  something,  the  substratum  
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of  time  might  still  be.  In  such  a  situation,  it  makes  sense  to  speak  of  time  as  being  in  something  
that  it,  strictly  speaking,  is  not.  Thus,  in  answering  (Q1),  Aristotle  defends  his  theory  of  time  
from  the  challenge  implicit  in  (Q2).  
  
2.0 Time  is  Located  Only  Where  Countable  Change  Is  
In  this  section  I  argue  that  Aristotle  is  committed  to  the  claim  that  time  is  located  only  where  
countable  change  is  located.  My  argument  for  this  claim  rests  on  Aristotle’s  definition  of  time  as  
'a  number  of  change  in  respect  of  the  before  and  after,  (219 b 1)'  and  further  claims  he  makes  about  
the  number  of  change.  
 
2.1 Evidence  in  Favor  
Just  what  Aristotle  means  by  'the  number  of  change  in  respect  to  the  before  and  after'  is  a  
controversial  topic. 3  Thankfully,  I  need  not  enter  into  that  controversy  in  order  to  establish  that   
Aristotle  took  time  to  be  located  only  where  countable  change  is  located.  The  important  issue  
for  my  purposes  in  the  above  definition  is  the  relation  between  change  and  the  number  of  
change.  If  the  number  of  change  is  something  that  is  located  only  where  countable  change  is  
located,  then  this  will  be  enough  to  establish  my  first  claim,  regardless  of  the  exact  meaning  of  
Aristotle’s  definition.  
Even  narrowing  the  scope  of  my  investigation  in  this  way  still  seems  to  leave  me  with  a  
difficult  interpretative  issue,  i.e.  Aristotle’s  metaphysics  of  abstract  numbers.  For  example,  some  
might  think  that  if  Aristotle  takes  abstract  numbers  to  be  located  nowhere  that  would  be  the  end  
3  See  Julia  Annas  (1976),  David  Bostock  (1980/2006),  Sarah  Waterlow  (1982),  Edward  Hussey  (1983),   
Richard  Sorabji  (1983),  Mario  Mignucci  (1984),  Ursula  Coope  (2005),  Anthony  Roark  (2003,  2004,  2005,  2009),  
and  Stephen  Makin  (2007).  
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for  my  thesis.  This  would  indeed  be  problematic  if  Aristotle  is  referring  to  abstract  numbers  in  
his  definition  of  time,  but  he  isn't.  Aristotle  makes  it  clear  in  several  passages  that  the  'number  of  
change'  in  the  definition  of  time  does  not  refer  to  the  kind  of  number  that  we  count  with,  i.e.,  the  
abstract  numbers,  but  instead  the  kind  of  number  that  we  count.   For  example:  
But  number  is  [so  called]  in  two  ways:  we  call  number  both  (a)  that  which  is  counted  and  
countable,  and  (b)  that  by  which  we  count.  Time  is  that  which  is  counted  and  not  that  by 
which  we  count.  (That  by  which  we  count  is  different  from  that  which  is  counted.)  
(219 b 6-8)  
  
And  again:  
It  is  the  same  time,  too,  everywhere  together,  but  before  and  after  it  is  not  the  same  
[time],  since  the  present  alteration  is  one,  but  the  past  alteration  and  the  future  one  are  
different,  and  time  is  not  the  number  by  which  we  count  but  the  number  which  is  counted ,  
and  this  number  turns  out  to  be  always  different  before  and  after,  because  the  nows  are  
different.  ( The  number  of  a  hundred  horses  and  that  of  a  hundred  men  is  one  and  the  
same,  but  the  things  of  which  it  is  the  number  are  different  –  the  horses  are  different  from  
the  men.)  (220 b 5-13)  
  
These  passages  don't  just  show  that  Aristotle  isn't  thinking  about  abstract  numbers,  they  also  
make  it  prima  facie  plausible  that  Aristotle  is  committed  to  the  claim  that  the  number  of  change  
is  located  only  where  change  is  located.  After  all,  when  we  count  horses  the  things  we  count  are,  
obviously,  the  horses  and,  trivially,  the  horses  are  located  only  where  the  horses  are  located.  But  
the  strongest  evidence  that  the  number  of  change  is  located  only  where  change  is  located  is  the  
passage  in  which  Aristotle  defines  time:  
But  time,  too,  we  become  acquainted  with  when  we  mark  off  change,  marking  it  off  by  
the  before  and  after,  and  we  say  that  time  has  passed  when  we  get  a  perception  of  the  
before  and  after  in  change.  We  mark  off  change  by  taking  them  to  be  different  things,  
and  some  other  thing  between  them;  for  whenever  we  conceive  of  the  limits  as  other  than  
the  middle,  and  the  soul  says  that  the  nows  are  two,  one  before  and  one  after,  then  it  is  
and  this  it  is  that  we  say  time  is.  (What  is  marked  off  by  the  now  is  thought  to  be  time:  let  
this  be  taken  as  true.)  (219 a 22-30)  
  
Consider  the  claims  that  Aristotle  makes  in  this  passage:  (i)  the  before  and  after  are  two  nows  
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('the  soul  says  that  the  nows  are  two,  one  before  and  one  after'), 4  (ii)  we  mark  off  change  by  the   
before  and  after  ('we  mark  off  change,  marking  it  off  by  the  before  and  after,'  and  'We  mark  off  
change  by  taking  them  {i.e.,  the  before  and  after}  to  be  different  things'),  and  (iii)  what  is  marked  
off  by  the  now  is  time  ('What  is  marked  off  by  the  now  is  thought  to  be  time:  let  this  be  taken  as  
true').  It  follows  from  (i)  and  (ii)  that  change  is  what  is  marked  off  by  the  now,  and  from  this  and  
(iii)  it  follows  that  time  is  change,  or  at  least  some  aspect  of  change.  If  time  is  change  or  some  
aspect  of  change,  then  time  can  only  be  where  change  is.  
Furthermore,  Aristotle  is  committed  not  to  the  claim  that  time  is  located  wherever  there  is  
any  change,  but  rather  to  the  claim  that  time  is  located  only  where  there  is  countable  change.  
Recall  from  above  (219 b 6-8)  that  he  identifies  time  with  the  number  of  change,  where  number  is  
that  which  is  counted  or  countable. 5  Consider  also  that  he  presents  his  definition  of  time  at   
219 b 1,  after  he  claims  that  'what  is  marked  off  by  the  now  is  thought  to  be  time,  (219 a 29-30)'  a  
thought  he  urges  us  to  take  as  true.  This  indicates  that  the  marked  off  aspect  of  change  is  
identical  to  the  number  of  change,  and  so  only  changes  that  are  countable  can  be  marked  off. 6   
So,  there  is  strong  textual  evidence  supporting  the  claim  that  Aristotle  is  committed  to  time  being  
located  only  where  countable  change  is  located.  
 
2.2 Evidence  Against  
4  This  claim  is  bolstered  further  by  Aristotle’s  later  claims:  “It  is  the  now  that  measures  time,  considered  as   
before  and  after,”  (219 b 11)  and  “the  now  is  the  before  and  after,  considered  as  countable.”  (21 9 b27)  
5  It  is  worth  pointing  out  that  Aristotle  repeats  the  claim  that  number  is  that  which  is  counted  or  countable  in   
the  passage  I  began  this  paper  with  (223 a 16-223 a 29).  
6  This  also  supports  the  stronger  claim  that  only  and  all  changes  that  are  countable  can  be  marked  off,  but   
the  left  to  right  reading  is  not  necessary  to  establish  my  thesis.  
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There  are  three  sets  of  passages  that  raise  problems  for  this  interpretation.  The  first  set  
(221 a 16-18,  221 a 26-30,  221 b 4-6,  and  221 b 28-31)  indicates  that  objects  that  are  in  time  are  
surrounded  by  time.  The  worry  is  that  if  objects  that  are  in  time  are  surrounded  by  time,  then  it  
would  seem  that  time  cannot  be  located  only  where  there  is  countable  change.  The  second  set  of  
passages  (221 b 28-31  and  222 b 30-223 a 15)  indicates  that  everything  that  comes  to  be,  ceases  to  be,  
or  changes  is  in  time.  The  worry  is  that  if  all  changing  objects  are  in  time,  then  it  would  seem  
that  there  is  time  wherever  there  is  change,  even  if  that  change  is  uncountable.  The  third  
problem  is  raised  by  just  one  passage,  220 b 5,  which  indicates  that  there  is  only  one  time.  The  
worry  is  that  if  there  is  only  one  time,  but  there  are  multiple  numbers  of  change  (each  countable  
change  having  its  own  number),  then  Aristotle  cannot  mean  for  us  to  strictly  identify  time  with  
the  number  of  change.  
 
2.21 First  Problem. First,  I  will  address  the  worry  that  if  objects  that  are  in  time  are  
surrounded  by  time,  then  it  would  seem  that  time  cannot  be  located  only  where  there  is  countable  
change.  Consider  a  quantity  of  water  increasing  in  temperature  from  75  degrees  to  80  degrees.  
The  change  is  countable  and  so  the  water  is  in  time.   But  Aristotle  claims:  
...  objects  are  [in  time]  as  they  are  in  number.  If  so,  they  are  surrounded  by  time  just  as  
the  things  in  number  are  by  number  and  the  things  in  place  by  place.  (221 a 16-18)  
  
And  again:  
Since  what  is  in  time  is  so  as  in  a  number,  there  will  be  found  a  time  greater  than  
anything  that  is  in  time,  so  that  of  necessity  all  things  that  are  in  time  are  surrounded  by  
time,  just  like  all  other  things  that  are  in  something:  e.g.,  the  things  that  are  in  place  [are  
surrounded]  by  place.  (221 a 26-30) 7   
  
Thus,  the  quantity  of  water  is  surrounded  by  time.  Insofar  as  it  makes  sense  to  speak  of  the  
7 The  other  two  passages,   221 b 4-6,  and  221 b 28-31,  raise  identical  worries.  
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location  of  place,  objects  in  place  are  surrounded  by  place  and  so  place  is  located  not  just  where  
objects  in  place  are  located  but  also  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  objects  in  place.  If  we  
understand  objects  in  time  in  the  same  way  we  understand  objects  in  place,  then  there  would  be  
time  literally  located  around  objects  in  time.  It  is  implausible  to  think  that  all  countable  changes  
are  surrounded  only  by  countable  changes,  and  so  it  must  be  that  some  time  is  located  where  
there  is  no  countable  change.  This  contradicts  my  claim  that  Aristotle  takes  time  to  be  located  
only  where  countable  change  is  located.  
However,  it  is  implausible  to  think  that  Aristotle  is  here  suggesting  that  time  is  literally 
located  around  objects  in  time.  He  explicitly  says  that  objects  are  in  time  as  they  are  in  number,  
not  as  they  are  in  place,  and  that  things  that  are  in  number  are  surrounded  by  number.  Numbers  
are  not  literally  located  around  objects  in  number.  Consider  a  hundred  horses  and  a  hundred  
men.  The  horses  and  the  men  are  both  in  number,  i.e.  they  are  both  a  hundred  in  number.  When  
Aristotle  says  that  objects  in  number  are  surrounded  by  number,  he  means  that  there  is  a  number  
before  (less  than)  and  after  (greater  than) 8  the  number  of  those  objects.  Likewise,  we  should   
understand  Aristotle  as  asserting  in  the  above  passages  that  when  objects  are  in  time  there  is  a  
time  before  and  after  the  time  they  are  in.  This  could  be  so  even  if  there  is  no  time  located  in  the  
immediate  vicinity  of  the  objects.  
 
2.22 Second  Problem.  More  problematic  is  the  worry  that  if  all  changing  objects  are  
8  Actually,  if  there  is  a  smallest  number,  which  Aristotle  asserts  that  there  is  (220 a 27-30),  then  not  all  objects   
in  number  are  not  completely  surrounded  by  number,  since  there  will  be  some  objects  in  number  of  which  there  is  no  
lesser  number.  Still,  there  would  be  a  greater  number  and  so  they  would  be  surrounded  in  the  sense  that  there  is  
always  a  number  greater  than  anything  in  number.  This  point  is  consistent  with  Aristotle’s  claim  above  that  “what  is  
in  time  is  so  as  in  a  number,  there  will  be  found  a  time  greater  than  anything  that  is  in  time.”  
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in  time,  then  it  seems  that  there  is  time  wherever  there  is  change,  even  if  that  change  is  
uncountable.   Aristotle  asserts:  
Now  all  things  that  admit  of  ceasing-to-be  and  coming-to-be  and  generally,  that  at  some  
time  are  and  at  some  time  are  not,  must  be  in  time  –  there  will  be  some  greater  time  
which  will  exceed  both  their  being  and  that  [time]  which  measures  their  being.  
(221 b 28-31)  
  
And  again:  
Now  that  we  have  determined  these  matters  in  this  way,  it  is  manifest  that  every  alteration  
and  all  that  changes  is  in  time.  ‘Faster’  and  ‘slower’  apply  to  every  alteration,  since  in  
every  case  this  is  obviously  true  ...  But  the  before  is  in  time,  for  we  use  ‘before’  and  
‘after’  according  to  the  distance  from  the  now,  and  the  now  is  the  boundary  of  the  past  
and  the  future.  So,  since  the  nows  are  in  time,  the  before  and  after  will  also  be  in  time  ...  
So,  since  the  before  is  in  time,  and  the  before  accompanies  every  change,  it  is  manifest  
that  every  alteration  and  every  change  is  in  time .   (222 b 30-223 a 15)  
  
If  some  changes  are  uncountable,  and  all  changes  are  in  time,  then  some  uncountable  changes  are  
in  time.  If  changes  are  in  time  only  if  time  is  located  where  they  are,  then  it  follows  that  time  is  
located  wherever  there  is  change  and  not  just  where  there  is  countable  change.  
As  a  first  response,  I  might  deny  that  Aristotle  takes  changes  to  be  in  time  only  if  time  is  
located  where  they  are.  There  is  some  support  for  this  in  Aristotle’s  explanation  of  how  it  is  that 
different  changes  can  be  in  the  same  time.  Since  time  is  the  number  of  change  for  Aristotle,  and  
different  changes  with  qualitatively  identical  numbers,  i.e.,  that  have  the  same  measure,  will  have  
quantitatively  different  numbers,  it  seems  that  Aristotle  is  committed  to  there  being  as  many  
times  as  there  are  countable  changes.  But  it  is  highly  intuitive  that  time  is  the  same  everywhere.  
So,  Aristotle  must  provide  an  account  of  how  this  is  so.  To  accomplish  this,  he  suggests  that,  
although  it  is  not  the  case  that  there  is  only  one  time  everywhere,  still  we  can  speak  truly  when  
we  say  that  two  changes  occur  in  the  same  time  because  we  merely  assert  that  the  numbers  of  the  
two  changes  are  of  the  same  kind,  i.e.  the  same  measure  (224 a 2-15).  This  establishes  that  




Furthermore,  Aristotle  indicates  that  it  is  appropriate  to  measure  one  change  by  the  units  
of  another  change,  as  when  we  say  that  a  journey  takes  a  day  (223 b 12-23).  In  this  case,  a  day  is  a  
unit  of  the  change  of  the  heavens,  and  yet  we  use  it  to  measure  the  change  in  location  of  a  
traveler.  Given  this,  it  seems  that  Aristotle  takes  it  to  be  appropriate  to  measure  one  change  by  
the  time  of  another  change.  But  then  a  change  need  not  be  measured  by  its  own  time  in  order  to  
be  in  time,  and  so  there  need  not  be  time  located  where  a  change  is  in  order  for  that  change  to  be  
in  time.  This  taken  with  the  argument  from  the  previous  paragraph  might  indicate  that,  although  
it  is  strictly  false  to  assert  that  the  time  of  an  uncountable  change  is,  say,  two  days,  still  we  can  
speak  truly  when  we  say  'The  time  of  an  uncountable  change  is  two  days'  by  using  this  sentence  
to  assert  only  that  the  number  of  change  of  the  heavens  as  marked  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  
of  the  uncountable  change  is  two  (days).  If  this  is  so,  then  when  Aristotle  says  that  all  changes  
are  in  time,  he  need  not  be  asserting  that  time  is  located  wherever  change  is  located.  
Unfortunately,  this  response  is  unavailable.  Aristotle’s  explicit  account  of  what  it  is  to  be  
in  time  is  as  follows:  
Since  time  is  a  measure  of  change  and  of  being-in-change,  and  since  it  measures  change  
by  defining  some  change  which  will  measure  out  the  whole  change  (just  as  the  cubit  
measures  length  by  defining  some  magnitude  which  will  measure  off  the  whole  
magnitude),  and  since  for  a  change  the  being  in  time  is  the  being  measured  by  time  both  
of  the  change  itself  and  of  its  being  (time  measures  at  once  the  change  and  the  being  of  
the  change,  and  this  is  what  it  is,  for  the  change,  to  be  in  time,  viz.  its  being’s  being  
measured),  it  is  clear,  then,  that  for  other  things  too  this  is  what  it  is  to  be  in  time:  their  
being’s  being  measured  by  time.  For  to  be  in  time  is  one  or  other  of  two  things:  either,  to  
be  when  time  is,  or  [to  be  in  it]  in  the  way  in  which  we  say  that  some  things  are  ‘in  
number’,  which  means  that  [something  is  in  number]  either  as  a  part  or  property  of  
number,  and,  in  general,  that  it  is  some  aspect  of  number,  or  that  there  is  a  number  of  it.  
And  since  time  is  a  number,  the  now  and  the  before  and  everything  of  that  kind  are  in  
time  in  the  way  in  which  the  limit  and  the  odd  and  the  even  are  in  number  (they  are  
aspects  of  number  as  the  others  are  of  time).  But  objects  are  [in  time]  as  they  are  in  
number.  If  so,  they  are  surrounded  by  time  just  as  things  in  number  are  by  number  and  




Aristotle  here  asserts  that  objects,  and  presumably  changes  as  well,  are  in  time  as  they  are  in  
number.  Changes  are  not  in  number  in  the  way  that  even  and  odd  are  in  number,  i.e.,  by  being  
aspects  of  number,  but  rather  in  number  in  the  way  that  one  hundred  horses  are  one  hundred  in  
number,  i.e.,  there  is  a  number  of  them.  So,  for  a  change  to  be  in  time  is  for  there  to  be  a  number  
of  that  change.  But  the  time  of  a  change  just  is  the  number  of  the  change,  and  so  any  change  that  
is  in  time  is,  ipso  facto ,  where  time  is.  We  must,  then,  take  Aristotle’s  comments  concerning  
measuring  one  change  by  the  time  of  another  change  to  only  apply  to  changes  that  are  
countable. 9    So,  the  response  above  cannot  work.  
However,  while  this  passage  rules  out  one  response  it  shows  the  way  to  another.  Because  
Aristotle  explicitly  asserts  here  that  the  only  changes  that  are  in  time  are  changes  that  are  
countable  it  cannot  be  that  he  takes  all  change  to  be  in  time.  Why,  then,  does  Aristotle  say  that  
all  changes  are  in  time  at  222 b 30-223 a 15?  One  possibility  is  that  he  is  speaking  loosely.  
According  to  Aristotle,  the  heavens  are  in  perpetual  circular  motion,  and  so  they  change  
eternally.  If  we  take  222 b 30-223 a 15  at  face  value,  then,  the  heavens  are  in  time.  But  elsewhere  
Aristotle  asserts:  
So  it  is  manifest  that  the  things  that  always  are,  considered  as  such,  are  not  in  time,  for  
they  are  not  surrounded  by  time,  nor  is  their  being  measured  by  time,  and  an  indication  of  
this  is  that  they  are  not  acted  on  at  all  by  time  either,  which  shows  that  they  are  not  in  
time.  (221 b 4-6)  
  
9  There  is  a  puzzle  here.  Aristotle  explicitly  denies  that  the  motion  of  the  heavens  is  in  time  since  there  is  no  
time  greater  than  the  time  of  the  motion  of  the  heavens.  If  the  motion  of  the  heavens  is  not  in  time,  then  it  cannot  be  
countable  both  because  being  a  countable  change  is  just  what  it  is  to  be  a  change  in  time  and  because  a  change  is  
only  countable  it  is  in  number  and  it  is  only  in  number  there  is  a  number  greater  than  it,  which  is  not  the  case  for  
motion  of  the  heavens.  Given  this,  how  can  the  number  of  the  motion  of  the  heavens  be  used  to  measure  other  
changes?  As  with  all  of  Aristotle’s  discussions  of  the  heavens,  this  is  a  difficult  issue  and  I  will  not  address  it  here.  
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So  it  cannot  be  that  Aristotle  means  to  assert  that  all  changes  are  in  time.  This  is  what  we  should  
expect  given  the  passage  at  221 b 28-31,  in  which  Aristotle  insists  only  that  all  changes  that  are  
surrounded  by  time  are  in  time.  If  he  later  claims  that  all  changes  are  in  time,  we  should 
understand  the  previous  qualification  to  be  implicit  unless  there  is  some  indication  that  Aristotle  
means  to  be  negating  that  qualification,  which  there  isn't.  
Still,  we  might  ask  why  Aristotle  asserts  that  all  changes  that  are  surrounded  by  time  are  
in  time.  Might  there  not  be  some  uncountable  changes  that  are  surrounded  by  time?  Given  what  
Aristotle  has  said,  the  answer  is  ‘no’.  Changes  are  in  time  in  the  way  that  changes  are  in  number.  
If  changes  are  in  number,  then  there  is  a  number  of  the  change.  So,  if  changes  are  in  time,  then  
there  is  a  time  of  the  change,  i.e.,  the  change  is  countable.  If  a  change  is  surrounded  by  time,  
then  the  change  is  in  time.  So,  if  a  change  is  surrounded  by  time,  then  it  is  countable.  Therefore,  
there  are  no  changes  surrounded  by  time  that  are  uncountable.  Notice  that  this  is  not  the  same  as  
asserting  that  there  are  no  uncountable  changes.  Aristotle  believes  that  such  changes  do  exist,  
e.g.,  the  change  of  the  heavens.  He  just  denies  that  they  are  in  time.  When  Aristotle  asserts  that  
all  non-eternal  changes  are  in  time,  then,  he  does  so  either  because  he  means  countable  
non-eternal  changes  or  because  he  thinks  there  are  no  uncountable  non-eternal  changes.  Either  
way,  he  is  not  committed  to  there  being  time  where  there  is  no  countable  change.  
 
2.23 Third  Problem.  If  Aristotle  identifies  time  with  change  qua  countable,  then  since  
there  are  multiple  distinct  countable  changes  he  must  take  there  to  be  multiple  distinct  times.  So,  
if  Aristotle  thinks  that  there  is  only  one  time  everywhere,  then  Aristotle  cannot  mean  for  time  to  
be  identical  to  change  qua  countable.  But  Aristotle  does  assert  that,  '{i}t  is  the  same  time,  too,  
everywhere  together,  (220 b 5)'  so  it  seems  that  he  cannot  mean  to  strictly  identify  time  with  
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change  qua  countable.  
It  is  true  that  Aristotle’s  assertion  at  220 b 5  is,  if  taken  as  a  literal  expression  of  Aristotle’s  
position,  incompatible  with  the  claim  that  time  is  strictly  identical  to  change  qua  countable.  
However,  there  is  evidence  to  suggest  that  Aristotle  is  speaking  loosely  at  220 b 5,  but  no  evidence  
to  suggest  that  he  is  doing  so  at  219 a 22-30.  Recall  that  Aristotle  takes  it  that  different  changes  
being  in  the  same  time  is  analogous  to  different  groups  of  objects  being  in  the  same  number.  
Since  the  number  in  question  is  the  number  we  count,  not  the  number  we  count  with,  this  
sameness  in  number  cannot  mean  that  the  numbers  of,  say,  a  group  of  seven  horses  and  a  group  
of  seven  dogs  is  truly  identical.  Rather,  they  are  merely  the  same  in  kind  (224 a 2-15).  Likewise,  
we  can  assert  that  two  changes  are  in  the  same  time  without  being  committed  to  denying  that  
there  are  two  distinct  times.  So,  Aristotle’s  assertion  at  220 b 5  does  not  really  conflict  with  his  
definition  of  time  at  change  qua  countable.  
 
3.0 Why  is  Time  Thought  to  be  Everywhere?  
In  the  previous  section  I  argued  that  Aristotle  is  committed  to  the  claim  that  time  is  located  only  
where  countable  change  is  located.  In  this  section  I  first  argue  that  this  supports  a  plausible  
account  of  why  Aristotle  juxtaposes  (Q1)  and  (Q2)  at  223 a 16-29.  I  then  contrast  my  
interpretation  of  this  passage  with  other  recent  interpretations.  
 
3.1 The  Interpretation  
In  this  paper  I  set  out  to  provide  an  account  of  the  relation  between  (Q1)  and  (Q2).  (Q1)  asks  
about  the  relation  between  time  and  the  soul,  while  (Q2)  asks  why  it  is  thought  that  time  is  in  
everything.  I  want  to  suggest  that  (Q1)  is  related  to  (Q2)  insofar  as  Aristotle’s  answer  to  (Q1)  
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draws  attention  to  a  way  to  answer  (Q2)  that  is  not  at  odds  with  Aristotle’s  theory  of  time.  
(Q2)  is  a  dangerous  question  for  Aristotle  because  if  time  is  thought  to  be  in  everything  
because  time  really  is  in  everything,  including  everything  in  the  heavens,  then  time  is  in  the  
changes  of  the  heavenly  bodies.  In  order  for  a  change  to  have  a  number  it  must  be  surrounded  
by  number,  i.e.,  there  must  be  a  number  greater  than  it.  But  since  the  motion  of  the  heavenly  
bodies  is  eternal  there  can  be  no  number  greater  than  it.  So  the  motion  of  the  heavenly  bodies  is  
not  in  number.  But  according  to  Aristotle,  time  just  is  the  number  of  change.  So  if  time  is  
thought  to  be  in  everything  because  time  really  is  in  everything,  then  Aristotle’s  definition  of  
time  cannot  be  correct.  It  is  therefore  incumbent  on  Aristotle  to  provide  an  account  of  why  it  is  
thought  that  time  is  in  everything  when,  strictly  speaking,  this  is  not  so.  
One  way  to  provide  such  an  account  is  to  consider  a  case  in  which  time  clearly  does  not  
exist,  and  yet  there  is  a  reason  to  think  that  it  does  exist.  To  this  end  Aristotle  considers  what  
would  be  the  case  if  no  intellective  souls  existed.  Since  only  intellective  souls  have  the  ability  to  
count,  nothing  would  be  countable  if  intellective  souls  did  not  exist. 10  Since  time  just  is  change   
qua  countable,  if  countable  change  were  impossible  then  time  would  be  impossible.  This  is  all  
pretty  straightforward.   However,  Aristotle  adds  a  caveat.   He  asserts:  
...it  is  impossible  that  there  should  be  time  if  there  is  no  soul,  except  that  there  could  be  
that  X  which  time  is,  whatever  X  makes  it  what  it  is;  as  for  example  if  it  is  possible  for  
there  to  be  change  without  soul.  The  before  and  after  are  in  change,  and  time  is  these  qua  
countable.  (223 a 26-29)  
  
10  There  is  some  difficulty  in  the  text  here.  Aristotle  actually  asserts  that  if  it  is  impossible  that  any   
intellective  souls  exist,  then  it  is  impossible  that  anything  is  countable.  He  then  goes  on  to  conclude  that  if  no  
intellective  souls  exist  (notice  the  dropped  'impossible'),  then  time  would  be  impossible.  Mario  Mignucci  (1984)  
makes  much  of  this  disparity  in  his  interpretation  of  this  passage.  I  will  address  this  in  section  3.23  below.  As  I  will  
make  clear,  it  is  an  advantage  of  my  interpretation  that  it  makes  explicable  Aristotle’s  apparent  carelessness.  
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Changes  are  not  dependent  on  the  existence  of  the  soul  and  so  they  would  still  exist  even  without  
souls.  Furthermore,  the  before  and  after  in  change  would  also  still  exist,  and  time  just  is  the  
before  and  after  in  change,  albeit  qua  countable.  So,  the  thing  that  is  actually  time  would  still  
exist  without  souls.  It  just  would  not  be  time  in  such  a  case.  Consider  a  mother.  A  mother  just  
is  a  woman  who  bears  a  certain  relation  to  her  children.  In  a  world  where  this  woman  did  not  
have  any  children  she  would  still  exist  but  she  would  no  longer  be  a  mother.  Still,  we  might  truly  
say,  'This  mother  would  exist  even  if  she  hadn’t  had  any  children',  because  the  woman  that  is  
actually  the  mother  would  exist.  Likewise,  even  though  time  would  not  exist  if  there  were  no  
souls,  still  we  might  truly  think,  'Time  would  exist  even  if  there  were  no  souls',  because  the  thing  
that  actually  is  time  would  exist,  i.e.,  the  before  and  after  in  change.  This  account  of  the  relation  
between  souls  and  time  gives  us  a  reason  to  think  that  even  without  souls  time  would  exist,  even  
though,  strictly  speaking,  time  would  not  exist  without  souls.  
I  think  that  this  is  an  intuitively  plausible  reading  of  Aristotle’s  answer  to  (Q1).  It  is  
further  bolstered  by  his  claim  that  'One  might  find  it  a  difficult  question,  whether  if  there  were  no  
soul  there  would  be  time  or  not.'  Without  his  caveat  playing  an  important  role  in  his  answer  to  
(Q1)  it  does  not  seem  like  a  particularly  difficult  question.  The  answer,  that  time  would  not  exist  
without  souls,  follows  pretty  immediately  from  claims  that  Aristotle  makes  elsewhere  concerning  
time,  number,  and  the  soul.  The  question  is  only  made  difficult  because  it  still  seems  that  time  
would  in  some  way  exist  without  souls.  The  difficulty  lies  in  providing  an  explanation  as  to  why  
this  is  so,  which  Aristotle  does  in  his  caveat.  
If  this  is  what  Aristotle  is  up  to  in  answering  (Q1),  it  provides  him  with  a  safe  way  of  
answering  (Q2),  i.e.,  of  explaining  why  it  is  that  it  is  thought  that  time  is  everywhere  given  that  
time  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  everywhere.  Since  time  is  the  before  and  after  in  change  qua  
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countable,  and  the  before  and  after  in  change  still  exist  even  when  change  is  not  countable,  the  
before  and  after  would  exist  in  eternal  changes  as  well.  So,  the  before  and  after  would  exist  in  
the  motion  of  the  heavens.  Since  the  existence  of  the  before  and  after  in  change  is  what  accounts  
for  the  truth  in  claims  like,  'Time  would  exist  even  if  there  were  no  souls',  it  could  also  account  
for  the  truth  in  claims  like,  'Time  is  in  everything  –  on  earth  and  in  the  sea  and  in  the  heavens.'  
The  thing  that  is  time  is  in  the  heavens  on  Aristotle’s  account;  it’s  just  not  time  there.  This  is  a  
reason  to  think  that  time  exists  everywhere.  Thus,  it  makes  sense  that  Aristotle  would  raise  (Q1)  
and  (Q2)  together,  since  his  answer  to  (Q1)  allows  him  to  safely  answer  (Q2).  
This  relationship  between  (Q1)  and  (Q2)  is  supported  by  the  further  questions  Aristotle  
asks  after  raising  (Q2):  
Is  it  that  it  {i.e.,  time}  is  a  property  or  a  state  of  change,  being  the  number  [of  it],  and  all  
these  things  {i.e.,  everything  on  earth  and  in  the  sea  and  in  the  heavens}  are  changeable,  
since  they  are  all  in  place,  and  time  and  change  are  together  both  in  potentiality  and  in  
actual  operation?  (223 a 18-21)  
  
Here  he  is  asking  if  the  reason  that  it  is  thought  that  time  is  in  everything  is  that  everything  is  
changeable  and  time  is  necessarily  in  whatever  is  changeable. 11  He  raises  this  question  without   
providing  an  explicit  answer  to  it.  If  we  take  his  answer  to  (Q1)  to  be  unrelated  to  (Q2),  then  this  
is  a  curious  omission.  However,  on  my  interpretation  of  the  relation  between  (Q1)  and  (Q2),  his  
answer  to  (Q1)  answers  the  question  above.  The  reason  suggested  at  223 a 18-21  cannot  be  the  
reason  that  time  is  thought  to  be  in  everything,  since  Aristotle  goes  on  to  argue  that  time  and  
change  are  not  together  in  potentiality.  Were  there  no  souls,  there  would  still  be  change  but  there  
would  be  no  time.  Instead,  the  reason  for  the  belief  is  the  one  I  suggest  above.  Notice  how  this  
interpretation  makes  sense  of  the  order  of  the  passage.  First,  Aristotle  raises  (Q1)  and  (Q2)  as  
though  they  are  related  to  one  another.  Then,  he  raises  the  question  at  223 a 18-21.  He  then  
11   See  Aristotle’s  comments  about  time  and  objects  at  rest  at  221 b 7-22.  
15  
  
answers  that  question  in  the  negative  by  providing  an  answer  to  (Q1),  thus  establishing  the  
relation  between  (Q1)  and  (Q2).  Finally,  in  qualifying  his  answer  to  (Q1)  he  provides  a  plausible  
answer  to  (Q2)  that  is  compatible  with  his  theory  of  time.  
Looking  at  the  passage  before  223 a 16-29  we  find  more  evidence  in  support  of  this  
interpretation.  At  223 a 14-15  Aristotle  asserts  that,  'since  the  before  is  in  time,  and  the  before  
accompanies  every  change,  it  is  manifest  that  every  alteration  and  every  change  is  in  time.'  
Immediately  after  this  passage  he  raises  (Q1)  and  (Q2).  My  interpretation  makes  sense  of  this  
structure.  Having  made  a  universal  claim,  he  considers  and  responds  to  objections  to  that  claim:  
time  would  not  exist  if  there  were  no  souls  and  time  does  not  exist  in  the  heavens.  His  answers  
to  (Q1)  and  (Q2)  make  his  claim  at  223 a 14-15  more  plausible:  every  non-eternal  change  is  
actually  in  time,  strictly  speaking,  and  all  changes  are  in  time,  loosely  speaking.  
One  might  object  that  if  Aristotle’s  only  goal  at  223 a 16-29  is  just  to  respond  to  (Q2)  in  a  
way  that  is  safe  for  his  theory,  there  is  no  real  reason  for  him  to  address  (Q1)  at  all.  Furthermore,  
if  this  is  his  goal,  we  should  expect  him  to  draw  explicit  conclusions  concerning  (Q2)  in  this  
passage,  which  he  does  not  do.  It  seems  more  likely  that  his  goal  in  this  passage  is  to  address  
(Q1),  not  (Q2).  
As  a  first  response,  I  should  point  out  that  I  have  not  claimed  that  Aristotle’s  only  goal  is  
to  provide  a  response  to  (Q2)  that  is  safe  for  his  theory.  Rather,  I  have  argued  that  taking  this  to  
be  one  goal  provides  a  plausible  interpretation  of  this  passage.  It  is  very  possible,  and  indeed  
likely,  that  Aristotle  was  interested  in  drawing  out  the  implications  of  his  theory  for  the  relation  
between  souls  and  time.  I  have  not  tried  to  explain  (Q2)  by  down-playing  (Q1).  Rather,  my  goal  
was  to  explain  why  (Q1)  and  (Q2)  are  juxtaposed  as  they  are.  I  agree  that  were  (Q1)  and  (Q2)  to  
be  raised  in  different  chapters,  then  my  interpretation  of  the  relationship  between  the  questions  
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would  be  significantly  less  plausible.  Furthermore,  I  agree  that  were  Aristotle  to  make  it  explicit  
that  (Q2)  raises  problems  for  his  theory  and  that  his  answer  to  (Q1)  helps  him  to  deal  with  those 
problems,  my  interpretation  would  be  on  much  better  footing.  But  the  fact  is  that  Aristotle  does  
not  explain  the  relationship  between  (Q1)  and  (Q2).  This  is  the  puzzle  that  motivated  this  paper.  
So,  unless  there  is  strong  reason  to  explain  the  juxtaposition  of  (Q1)  and  (Q2)  in  a  way  that  is  
inconsistent  with  my  interpretation,  I  take  it  that  I  can  safely  dismiss  these  worries.  
 
3.2 Other  Interpretations  
In  the  previous  section  I  provided  evidence  in  support  of  my  interpretation  of  223 a 16-29.  In  this  
section,  I  explore  other  interpretations  of  this  passage.  Since  no  other  interpretations  are  
concerned  to  explain  why  it  is  that  Aristotle  juxtaposes  (Q1)  and  (Q2),  no  other  interpretations  
present  a  direct  challenge  to  mine.  However,  just  what  Aristotle  is  doing  in  his  answer  to  (Q1)  is  
an  issue  discussed  at  some  length  in  the  literature,  and  since  my  thesis  depends  on  the  claim  that  
Aristotle  here  suggests  that  the  thing  that  time  actually  is  might  exist  even  if  time  does  not  exist,  
I  will  focus  on  this  aspect  of  competing  interpretations.  
 
3.21 Sorabji.  In  his  exploration  of  223 a 16-29,  Sorabji  focuses  on  the  issue  of  
countability.  In  particular,  he  is  concerned  to  find  out  just  why  it  is  that  Aristotle  took  
countability  to  be  dependent  on  the  existence  of  souls.  He  considers  various  reasons  for  this  in  
light  of  commentary  by  later  philosophers.  However,  this  issue  is  not  relevant  to  my  
interpretation  so  long  as  it  remains  the  case  that  Aristotle  suggests  that,  while  nothing  would  be  
countable  if  there  were  no  souls,  the  before  and  after  in  change  would  still  exist.  But  Sorabji  
does  make  trouble  for  this  claim.  
17  
  
It  is  strange,  Sorabji  suggests,  that  Aristotle  would  entertain  the  possibility  that  there  
might  be  the  before  and  after  in  change  without  time.  How  can  something  change  in  no  time  at  
all?  In  order  to  avoid  attributing  this  position  to  Aristotle,  Sorabji  argues  that  Aristotle  only 
considered  the  possibility  of  change  without  soul  hypothetically:  
The  "if"  {in  "if  it  is  possible  for  there  to  be  change  without  soul"}  is  not  fulfilled  in  
Aristotle’s  view.  For  change  in  the  universe  requires  motion,  which  in  turn  requires  an  
unmoved  mover  or  movers,  who  must  act  as  final  causes,  inspiring  the  souls  of  the  
spheres  which  carry  round  the  stars.  (1983:  93)  
  
The  argument,  then,  is  that  given  claims  Aristotle  makes  elsewhere,  he  is  committed  to  change  
existing  only  if  souls  exist.  Therefore,  it  is  not  possible  for  there  to  be  change  without  soul  and  
we  need  not  take  Aristotle  to  be  suggesting  that  the  before  and  after  in  change  could  exist  
without  souls.  
There  are  two  available  responses  to  this  problem.  First,  even  if  Sorabji  is  correct  and  
Aristotle  took  it  to  be  impossible  that  there  could  be  change  without  soul,  this  is  not  really  
necessary  for  my  interpretation.  If  Aristotle’s  answer  to  (Q1)  makes  it  clear  why  we  might  think 
time  exists  somewhere  when  it  does  not  really  exist  there,  it  does  not  really  matter  whether  or  not  
the  case  that  makes  this  clear  is  possible.  However,  it  would  be  strange  that  Aristotle  would  
choose  such  a  case  to  illustrate  his  point.  But  we  need  not  concede  Sorabji’s  claim  to  him.  It  is  
not  obvious  that  Aristotle  means  for  the  existence  of  change  to  imply  the  existence  of  intellective  
souls.  So,  if  we  read  his  caveat  as  being  limited  to  considerations  of  what  would  be  the  case  
were  there  no  intellective  souls,  it  is  not  obvious  that  the  ‘if’  is  not  fulfilled  in  Aristotle’s  view.  
 
3.22 Coope.  On  the  face  of  it,  Aristotle’s  treatment  of  (Q1)  seems  to  involve  the   
following  two  questions:  
(Q3) Is  a  state  of  affairs  in  which  there  is  time  but  no  souls  possible?  
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(Q4) Is  a  state  of  affairs  in  which  there  is  change  but  no  souls  possible?  
If  these  are  the  questions  that  he  is  asking,  and,  furthermore,  the  answers  he  gives  are  'no'  and  
'yes'  respectively,  then  it  seems  that  Aristotle  is  here  committed  to  the  claim  that  a  state  of  affairs  
in  which  there  is  change  but  no  time  is  possible,  e.g.,  if  there  were  no  souls.  And  this  indeed  
seems  to  be  incompatible  with  his  earlier  claim  that:  
...  it  is  manifest  that  every  alteration  and  all  that  changes  is  in  time.  "Faster"  and  "slower"  
apply  to  every  alteration,  since  in  every  case  this  is  obviously  true.  (I  say  that  changes  
faster  which  is  earlier  to  alter  into  a  given  [state],  changing  over  the  same  extension  and  
with  uniform  change  (e.g.,  in  the  case  of  locomotion,  if  both  things  are  changing  along  
the  curve  or  along  the  straight  line,  and  in  other  cases  similarly).)  But  the  before  is  in  
time,  for  we  use  "before"  and  "after"  according  to  the  distance  from  the  now,  and  the  now  
is  the  boundary  of  the  past  and  the  future.  So,  since  the  nows  are  in  time,  the  before  and  
after  will  also  be  in  time;  for  the  distance  from  the  now  will  be  in  that  in  which  the  now  
is.  ("Before"  is  applied  in  opposite  ways  in  relation  to  the  past  time  and  to  future  time:  in  
the  past,  we  call  "before"  what  is  further  from  the  now,  and  "after"  what  is  nearer  to  it,  
but  in  the  future  we  call  "before"  what  is  nearer  and  "after"  what  is  further.)  So,  since  the  
before  is  in  time,  and  the  before  accompanies  every  change,  it  is  manifest  that  every  
alteration  of  every  change  is  in  time.  (222 b 30-223 a 15)  
  
Coope  maintains  that  we  should  not,  however,  read  Aristotle  as  asking  (Q3)  and  (Q4).  Her  
primary  reason  for  thinking  that  he  is  asking  some  other  questions  is  the  following  argument.  
Aristotle  maintains  that  there  always  have  been  and  always  will  be  intellective  souls.  Aristotle  
maintains  further  that  whatever  exists  always,  i.e.,  eternally,  exists  necessarily.  So,  Aristotle  
maintains  that  intellective  souls  exist  necessarily.  But  if  Aristotle  maintains  this,  then  the  
answers  to  (Q3)  and  (Q4)  should  both  be  'no,'  and  trivially  so,  since  it  is  impossible  for  there  to  
be  no  intellective  souls.  But  clearly  Aristotle  takes  himself  to  be  asking  interesting  and  puzzling  
questions,  not  trivial  questions.  So,  Coope  maintains,  we  should  interpret  this  passage  in  some  
way  that  has  Aristotle  asking  questions  other  than  those  above  (2005:  161).  
Coope  suggests  the  following  questions:   
(Q5)  Does  the  nature  of  time  imply  that  time  cannot  exist  without  intellective  souls?  
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(Q6)  Does  the  nature  of  change  imply  that  change  cannot  exist  without  intellective  souls?  
Since  a  thing’s  nature  is  determined  by  its  definition  for  Aristotle  and  since  the  definition  of  time  
is  'a  number  of  change  in  respect  of  the  before  and  after',  it  follows  from  Aristotle’s  argument  in  
223 a 16-29  that  the  nature  of  time  implies  that  time  cannot  exist  without  intellective  souls.  On  the  
other  hand,  Aristotle  asserts  that  change  is  'the  actuality  of  that  which  potentially  is,  qua  such.'  
If,  for  example,  a  mass  of  bronze  has  the  potential  to  be  a  statue,  then  the  process  of  that  
potential  being  actualized,  i.e.,  the  bronze  being  made  into  a  statue,  is  change  in  the  bronze.  
Likewise,  if  a  ball  at  point  A  has  the  potential  of  being  at  point  B ,  then  the  process  of  that  
potential  being  actualized,  i.e.,  the  ball  moving  from  point  A  to  point  B ,  is  change  in  the  ball.  
Coope  asserts  that  the  addition  of  'qua  such'  to  Aristotle’s  account  is  meant  to  distinguish  the  
actuality  of  the  bronze  insofar  as  it  is  bronze,  which  would  not  be  a  change  in  the  bronze, 12  from   
the  actuality  of  the  bronze  insofar  as  it  is  potentially  a  statue,  which  would  be  a  change,  and  the  
actuality  of  the  ball  insofar  as  it  is  at  point  A ,  which  would  not  be  a  change,  from  the  actuality  of  
the  ball  insofar  as  it  is  potentially  at  point  B ,  which  would  be  a  change.  So,  since  Aristotle  
defines  change  in  terms  of  potentiality,  and  since  this  potentiality  is  not  necessarily  dependent  on  
the  existence  of  souls,  Coope  maintains  that  it  does  not  follow  from  the  definition  of  change  
alone  that  it  cannot  exist  without  souls.  
So,  on  Coope’s  interpretation,  Aristotle’s  assertions  at  223 a 21-9  and  222 b 30-223 a 15  are  
consistent.  At  222 b 30-223 a 15  Aristotle  is  asserting  that  change  could  not  exist  without  time,  and  
he  does  assert  at  223 a 21-9,  if  Coope  is  correct,  that  it  follows  from  the  definition  of  time  that  
time  could  not  exist  without  souls.  It  follows  from  this  that  change  could  not  exist  without  souls  
but,  Coope  argues,  Aristotle  does  not  assert  that  this  follows  from  the  definition  of  change  and  in  
12   Since  it  was  already  bronze.  
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fact  suggests  that  this  does  not  follow  from  the  definition  of  change.  
This  raises  problems  for  my  interpretation.  If  Aristotle  is  here  asserting  something  about  
the  definition  of  time  and  change,  and  not  suggesting  that  change  could  exist  even  if  souls  did  
not  exist,  then  his  answer  to  (Q1)  would  not  suggest  an  answer  to  (Q2)  that  is  compatible  with  
his  theory  of  time.  
However,  there  is  a  difficulty  with  Coope’s  interpretation.  For  her  interpretation  to  be  
plausible,  it  must  be  that  it  follows  in  some  way  from  the  definition  of  time  that  time  could  not  
exist  without  souls  and  that  it  does  not  follow  in  the  same  way  from  the  definition  of  change  that  
change  could  not  exist  without  souls.  In  what  way  does  it  follow  from  the  definition  of  time  that  
time  could  not  exist  without  souls?  It  certainly  does  not  follow  directly.  Rather,  it  follows  from  
the  definition  of  time,  i.e.,  a  number  of  change  in  respect  of  the  before  and  after,  the  definition  of  
number,  i.e.,  that  which  is  counted  or  countable,  and  auxiliary  claims  concerning  the  relation  
between  countability  and  the  soul.  Given  this,  it  is  not  obvious  that  it  does  not  follow  in  the  
same  way  from  the  definition  of  change  that  change  could  not  exist  without  souls.  After  all,  
given  the  definition  of  change,  i.e.,  the  actuality  of  that  which  potentially  is,  qua  such,  auxiliary  
claims  concerning  the  relation  between  change  and  time,  particularly  those  made  at  
222 b 30-223 a 15,  and  definitions  and  claims  considered  above  concerning  time,  number,  and  
countability,  it  does  follow  that  change  could  not  exist  without  souls.  The  difference  between  the  
way  in  which  it  follows  from  the  definition  of  time  that  time  could  not  exist  without  souls  and  
the  way  in  which  it  follows  from  the  definition  of  change  that  change  could  not  exist  without  
souls  is  one  of  degree,  not  of  kind.  There  are  simply  more  steps  between  the  definition  of  
change  and  the  relevant  conclusion  than  there  are  between  the  definition  of  time  and  the  relevant  
conclusion.  It  is  not  clear  why  this  should  make  it  the  case  that  the  conclusion  concerning  the  
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relation  of  soul  and  time  follows  from  the  definition  of  time  but  the  corresponding  conclusion  
concerning  the  relation  of  soul  and  change  does  not  follow  from  the  definition  of  change.  Thus,  
Coope’s  interpretation  is  incomplete  as  it  stands.  
This  does,  however,  leave  me  with  the  following  challenge:  why  does  Aristotle  seem  to  
assert  at  223 a 21-29  that  change  can  exist  without  time  while,  at  222 b 30-223 a 15,  he  clearly  states  
that  this  could  not  be  so?  It  is  important  to  remember  that  we  have  to  take  Aristotle  to  be  
implicitly  qualifying  his  claims  in  222 b 30-223 a 15  to  refer  only  to  non-eternal  changes  no  matter  
what  interpretation  we  accept.  Given  this,  it  is  not  implausible  to  think  that  Aristotle  also  
implicitly  qualifies  these  claims  to  refer  only  to  what  is  actually  the  case,  not  to  what  might  be  
the  case  were  the  world  otherwise.  So,  it  is  not  implausible  to  think  that  222 b 30-223 a 15  and  
223 a 21-29  are  not  incompatible  after  all.  
 
3.23 Inconsistency  in  Aristotle’s  Argument.  In  closing,  I  want  to  consider  a  
complication  in  Aristotle’s  argument  at  223 a 21-29.  At  223 a 25,  Aristotle  explicitly  asserts  that,  'if  
there  is  nothing  that  has  it  in  its  nature  to  count  except  soul  ...,  then  it  is  impossible  that  there  
should  be  time  if  there  is  not  soul.'  Mario  Mignucci  (1984)  argues  that  this  conclusion  is  not  
warranted  by  Aristotle’s  argument  and,  further,  that  Aristotle  did  not  intend  to  draw  a  conclusion  
this  strong.  Rather,  Mignucci  takes  Aristotle  to  be  arguing  for  the  weaker  conclusion  that  if  it  is  
impossible  for  there  to  be  souls,  then  it  is  impossible  for  there  to  be  time.  Crucially,  Aristotle  
claims  that  'if  it  is  impossible  for  there  to  be  something  to  do  the  counting,  it  is  also  impossible  
that  anything  should  be  countable.'  But  from  this  premise  Aristotle  cannot  validly  infer  that  if  
there  were  nothing  to  do  the  counting,  then  there  would  be  nothing  countable.   Mignucci  writes:  
What  is  clear  is  that  Aristotle  assumes  [if  it  is  impossible  for  there  to  be  something  which  
does  the  counting,  then  it  is  impossible  for  there  to  be  something  which  can  be  counted],  
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but  not  [if  it  is  not  the  case  that  there  is  something  which  does  the  counting,  then  it  is  not  
the  case  that  there  is  something  which  can  be  counted]  as  a  self-evident  statement.  It  is  
the  impossibility  of  the  existence  of  someone  doing  the  counting  that  entails  the  
impossibility  of  there  being  countable  things.  But  let  us  imagine  that  nobody  does  the  
counting  (without  implying  that  it  is  impossible  for  there  to  be  anyone  who  does  the  
counting).  It  does  not  follow  from  this  that  countable  things  cannot  exist.  There  can  be  
ten  horses  even  if  nobody  actually  counts  them.  The  possibility  of  having  ten  horses  is  
compromised  only  by  the  hypothesis  that  there  cannot  be  someone  doing  the  counting.  
(1984:  186)   
  
On  the  other  hand,  Sorabji  suggests  that  Aristotle  never  intended  the  weaker  premises.  He  
writes:  
...why,  at  the  beginning,  does  he  envisage  that  there  " cannot"  exist  someone  to  do  the  
counting,  and  that  there  cannot  be  anything  countable?  But  I  presume  he  only  means  it  
cannot  be  the  case  that,  if  souls  does  not  exist,  there  exists  someone  doing  the  counting.  
And  again,  it  cannot  be  the  case  that,  if  no  one  exists  to  do  the  counting,  there  is  anything  
countable.  (1983:  90)  
  
This  reinterpretation  of  Aristotle’s  premises  does  support  the  strong  conclusion.  
So,  Mignucci  argues  that  Aristotle  meant  the  weaker  premises  and  the  weaker  conclusion,  
while  Sorabji  argues  that  Aristotle  meant  the  stronger  premises  and  the  stronger  conclusion.  
Coope,  on  the  other  hand,  argues  that,  although  Aristotle’s  argument  only  supports  the  weaker  
conclusion,  his  weaker  conclusion,  when  bolstered  by  claims  he  makes  elsewhere,  implies  his  
stronger  conclusion.   She  writes:   
On  Aristotle’s  view,  the  weaker  conclusion  [if  it  is  impossible  for  there  to  be  anything  
that  is  able  to  count,  then  it  is  impossible  for  there  to  be  time]  implies  the  stronger  [if  
there  is  nothing  able  to  count,  then  there  can  be  not  time].  The  ability  to  count  is  an  
ability  that  a  thing  has  in  virtue  of  having  an  intellective  soul.  But  to  have  an  intellective  
soul  is  to  be  a  member  of  some  kind  that,  if  it  exists,  exists  eternally.  Hence,  if  there  
were  ever  a  time  at  which  nothing  was  able  to  count,  then  there  would  never  be  anything  
able  to  count.  But  according  to  Aristotle,  a  world  in  which  there  was  never  anything  able  
to  count  would  be  a  world  in  which  it  was  impossible  for  there  to  be  anything  to  count.  
(2005:  165)  
  
How  is  this  argument  supposed  to  work?  Take  it  as  established  that  if  it  is  impossible  for  there  to  
be  anything  able  to  count,  then  it  is  impossible  for  there  to  be  time.  Now,  that  which  is  able  to  
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count  is  able  to  count  in  virtue  of  having  an  intellective  soul.  Since  humans  have  intellective  
souls 13  and  since  humans  exist  eternally,  that  which  is  able  to  count  exists  eternally  if  it  exists   
ever.  So,  if  that  which  is  able  to  count  ever  fails  to  exist,  then  it  eternally  fails  to  exist.  Coope  
attributes  to  Aristotle  the  claim  that  whatever  eternally  fails  to  exist  is  impossible.  So,  if  there  is  
nothing  able  to  count,  then  it  is  impossible  for  there  to  be  anything  able  to  count.  This  
conclusion  and  the  weaker  conclusion  above  entail  the  stronger  conclusion  that  if  there  is  
nothing  able  to  count,  then  it  is  impossible  for  there  to  be  time.  
There  is,  however,  at  least  one  dubious  step  in  this  argument.  There  are  two  senses  in  
which  whatever  has  the  ability  to  count  has  that  ability  in  virtue  of  having  an  intellective  soul.  
The  first  sense  just  amounts  to  the  claim  that  only  that  which  has  an  intellective  soul  has  the  
ability  to  count.  The  second  sense  amounts  to  the  claim  that  whatever  has  an  intellective  soul  
has  the  ability  to  count.  On  the  second  sense,  the  claim  is  patently  implausible.  It  seems  that  a  
young  child  has  an  intellective  soul  but  might  not  have  the  ability  to  count.  But  on  the  first  
sense,  the  claim  does  not  support  Coope’s  argument.  Even  granting  that  intellective  souls  exist  
eternally  if  they  exist  at  all,  on  the  first  sense  of  the  claim,  it  would  not  follow  that  whatever  is  
able  to  count  exists  eternally  if  it  exists  at  all.  Perhaps  due  to  something  in  the  water,  we  might  
all  preserve  our  intellective  souls  but  lose  our  ability  to  count.  So,  in  order  to  make  her  
interpretation  plausible,  Coope  must  show  that  the  ability  to  count  is  inseparable  from  having  an  
intellective  soul  in  the  second  sense  above.  
At  the  very  least,  we  can  conclude  that  Aristotle  is  not  as  careful  in  this  passage  as  we  
would  expect  him  to  be  if  he  is  trying  to  establish  an  important  conclusion  concerning  the  
relation  of  soul  and  time.  However,  if  this  is  not  his  primary  goal,  if,  as  I  have  argued,  he  is  
13   See  footnote  on  p.165  of  Coope  (2005).  
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using  the  case  of  a  world  without  souls  as  a  way  of  illustrating  an  answer  to  (Q2),  then  this  lapse  
is  understandable.  On  my  interpretation,  what  matters  for  Aristotle’s  purposes  in  this  passage  is  
that  he  shows  why  it  is  that  people  think  that  time  is  everywhere  when,  strictly  speaking,  it  is  
not. 14   
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